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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
PEPPERIDGE FARM,

INC.,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

)
)

THE BOl\RD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT
)
OF EMPLOYMEtJT SECURITY, INDUSTRIAL)
C0!-1'-lISSION OF UTAH; JOHN I.
)
JOHNSON; and AUSTIN c. NOLISA,
)

Case No. 16655

)

Defendants.

)

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah seeking judicial review of a decision of the
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which
determined cJ aiman ts John I. Johnson and Austin C. Nolisa to be
qualified to receive unemployment benefits from December 17,
1978 to January 27,

1979.

DISPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Defendant-claimants John I. Johnson and Austin C.
Molisa filed claims for unemployment compensation which were
granted by representatives of the Department of Employment
Security.

The decision entitling claimants to receive benefits
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.
was, following plaintiff's timely appeal, reversed by the
Appeal Referee.

The defendant-claimants appe2led and the Boarc

of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah reversed the
decision of the Appeal Referee and reaffirmed the decisioo of
the Department Representative allowing the Clefencant-claimants
to receive unemployment benefits.

Plaintiff's Petition for

Reconsideration and Request for Oral Argument was denied by

t~,'

Board of Review.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiff petitions this court to reverse the decisic•
of the Board of Review, Department of Employment Security,
Industrial Commission of Utah and determine that
defendant-claimants John I. Johnson and Austin C. Nolisa were
ineligible to receive unempJ oymen t benefits from December 19,
1978 to January 27, 1979, and that the overpayments receivedh

said claimants be repaid or deducted from future unemployment
benefits received.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
John I. Johnson and Austin C. Nolisa voluntarily
terminat~d

their employment with Pepperidge Farm, Inc. on

Septer.:ber 23, 1978.

Mr. Johnson had been employed by plaintif'

since June, 1976 while Mr. Nolisa had been in plaintiff's
employ since March, 1976.

At the time of their voluntary

termination, both claimants were employed full-time and held
41
the position of Plant Services "B" employees at a wage of $ .i
per hour.
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Pepperidge Farm began manufacturing operations in
Richmond, Utah in 1974.

Job classifications were established

according to the practices of other Pepperidge Farm plants in
other areas of the country.

As the plant management became

acquainted with its own operations and employment needs, it
became apparent that some job reclassifications were necessary.
A management committee reviewed job responsibilities
in August, 1977, and certain employee positions were
reclassified.

At the time of this review, claimants Johnson

and Nolisa were employed on the afternoon shift as Plant
Services Helpers.

As a result of the committees review, the

job classification of Plant Services Helper was divided into
two separate groups or job classifications:
2nd "Plant Services B".

"Plant Services A"

The "A" group was given higher pay due

to their greater responsibilities.
When reclassification occurred, claimants Johnson and
~lisa

were not working the same shift as those employees

reclassified as Plant Services "A".

Consequently, the

defendant-claimants remained in the Plant Services "B" group
and their wages were not increa8ed since their responsibilities
were different from those in the "A" group.

Claimants

requested a reconsideration of their positions on two separate
occassions.

Both times the committee determined that the

distinction between the job classifications of Plant Services
"B" and Plant Services "A" employees was proper and appropriate.

- 3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.,
On at least five separate occassions subsequent

tot~

job reclassifications, both claimants had an opportunity to bid
for the position of Plant Services "A".

Neither claimant made

any effort to bid for this position and consequently, both
remained in group "B".
On August 29, 1978 claimants Johnson and Nolisa were
both disciplined for failure to carry through or accept
direction from their supervisors.

Claimant Johnson was

suspended for two days without pay for insubordination.
Claimant Nolisa was suspended for five days without pay.
At the time of his suspension, Nolisa informed
plaintiff that he was going to quit anyway to go back to school
and that he planned to terminate on September 23, 1979.
Claimant Johnson also gave notice at the time of his suspension,
of his intent to voluntarily terminate on September 23, 1979,
stating that he also was returning to school.
Subsequent to their suspension, both claimants
returned to their regular employment until they
quit on September 23, 1979 as planned.

voluntari~

When presented with

discharge slips which indicated their reason for terminati~ e
"quitting to return to school", both claimants refused to
accept the discharge slips and requested that they be rewritten
to state that the claimants had "resigned", which plaintiff did.
The defendant-claimants filed claims for unemployment
benefits with the Utah Department of Employment Security durin~
the month of November, 1978, requesting eligibility for
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i

b~efits

from the date of their voluntary termination of

employment with plaintiff.

A Department Representative of the

defendant-Industrial Commission determined both claimants
eligible to receive unemployment compensation effective
December 17, 1978 on the grounds that their separations were
not disqualifying.
Upon learning that the defendant-claimants had applied
for unemployment benefits and had been determined eligible to
receive compensation, plaintiff appealed the decision of the
~partment

Representative.

A hearing with the Appeal Referee

in the Appeals Office of the Industrial Commission of Utah,
De par tmen t of Employment Security, was held in Logan, Utah on
Fehruary 8, 1979.
The Appeal Referee determined that claimants Johnson
Md Nolisa had voluntarily terminated their employment with
plaintiff without good cause and had received unemployment
benefits to which they were not entitled.

The Appeal Referee

reversed the decision of the Department Representative and
determined that both claimants were disqualified from receiving
unemplovment compensation from December 17, 1978 to January 27,
1979 pursuant to Section 35-4-S(a) of the Utah Employment

Security Act.

The reversal also provided that the overpayments

received by the defendant-claimants would be deducted from any
future unemployment benefits received by them after January 27,
inq.

- 5 -
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The defendant-claimants appealed the decision of the
Appeal Referee to the Board of Review,

Industrial Commission of

Utah, and submitted to the Board of Review a Memorandum of
Points and Authorities dated March 27, 1979, a Motion for
Admission of Affidavits dated March 22, 1979, and Affidavits
dated March 14, 1979.

Plaintiff filed a Responsive Memorandum

with the Board of Review dated May 18, 1979, in addition to a
Notice of Right Reserved to File Counter Affidavits dated May
18, 1979, and an Affidavit dated May 25, 1979.
The Board of Review in a split decision, James F.
Hannon dissenting,

reversed the decision of the Appeal Referee

and affirmed the decision of the Department Representative in
ruling that the defendant-claimants voluntarily left work with
good cause and were eligible to receive unemployment benefits
effective December 17, 1978.

The Board of Review

declined~

reconsider its decision despite plaintiff's Petition for
Reconsideration and Request for Oral Argument dated July 18,
1979.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT
CLAIMANTS HAD GOOD CAUSE FOR VOLUNTARILY
TERMINATING THEIR EMPLOYMENT WITH PLAINTIFF
The Utah Supreme Court has held on more than one

•

occassion that where a decision of the Industrial Commission
concerning the right of a claimant to receive unemployment
compensation is unsupported by substantial evidence, a

reversal

- 6 -
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J.

of the order is appropriate.

Martinez v. Board of Review,

Department of Employment Security, 25 Utah 2d 131, 477 P.2d 587
(1970); Kennecott Copper Corp. Employees v. Department of

Ernoloyment Security, 13 Utah 2d 262, 372 P. 2cl 987 (1962).
Indeed, a reversal of the decision of the Board of Review,
Industrial Commission of Utah is justified in the instant case.
Although the defendant-claimants maintain that their
voluntary termination of employment with Pepperidge Farm was
justified and not disqualifying, the evidence on record fails
to support a finding that claimants Johnson and Nolisa quit
their employr.ien t with good cause.
Claimants have alleged that they were forced to
terminate their employment with plaintiff and that they were
harrassed and mistreated by plaintiff.
00070, 00072,

00073, 00074).

(R. 00068, 00069,

The evidence, however,

establishes that the defendant-claimants were not forced to
guit their jobs but rather terminated their employment with
plain tiff voluntarily and of their own free will.
After quitting their jobs with plaintiff, both
claimants filed with the defendant-Industrial Commission to
receive unemployment benefits.

The claims for benefits

submitted by defendants Johnson and Nolisa did not state that
they were forced to leave plaintiff's employment.

Not only did

the claimants make no mention of the now alleged harrassment
and mistreatment, but both claimants indicated on their claims
ii

for unemployment benefits that their reason for unemployment
was simply that they "Quit".

(R. 00123, 00124).

- 7 -
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The defendant-claimants voluntarily tf'rminated their
employment with plaintiff in order to return to school, not
because of any pressure, harrassment, mistreatment or force on
the part of plaintiff.

Both claimants, well in advance of

their termination date, informed plaintiff that they were
quitting to return to school.

(R.

00038,

00082, 00085, 00091,

00101).
Claimant Johnson commenced work for plaintiff in June,
1976 as a Plant Services Helper, later reclassified as a PlMt
Services "B" employee.

( R. 0 0 0 3 8 , 0 0 0 4 2 , 0 0 0 6 7 , 0 0 0 6 8) .

In

August, 1978, Johnson was suspended for two days without pay
for insubordination.

(R. 00037, 00042).

At the time of his

suspension he stated that he was "going to quit."
why, he responded,

"I am going back to school."

When asked
Johnson stated

that his last day of employment with plaintiff would be
September 23, 1979.

(R. 00042, 00082, 00085, 00091).

Claimant Nolisa began working for plaintiff in May,
1976 as a production worker and later became a Plant Services
Helper, reclassified as a Plant Services "B" employee.
00038, 00043, 00072).

(R.

Nolisa was insubordinate to his foreman

on August 28, 1978 and was suspended for five days without
pay.

(R. 00037, 00072, 00073).

At the time of his suspension,

Nolisa informed plaintiff that he was quitting anyway and
planned to leave September 23, 1978 in order to return to
school.

(R.

00037,

00038,

00043,

00091).
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That the defendant-claimants voluntarily terminated
their employment with plain tiff so that they could return to
school was further pointed out by the testimony of Dale stokes,
Prrsonnel Manager of Pepperidge Farm, at the hearing whith the
Appeal Referee on February 8, 1978:
On August 29, 1978, both John Johnson and Austin
Nolisa gave notice to Pepperidge Farms of their
impending termination.
They both stated at that time,
they would be resigning.
Their last day of work would
he September 23, 1978.
Their resignation was due to
the fact that they were going to return to school on a
full-time basis.
On September 23, 1978, they did in
fact work their last day.
(R. 00091).

Following their suspension, claimants returned to
their work and continued working their regular shifts until
September 23, 1978 when they both quit as they had planned.
When the defendant-claimants were presented with their
discharge slips upon termination, which indicated that they
11·ere "quitting to return to school", claimants Johnson and
~lisa

refused to accept their discharge slips and requested

plaintiff to rewrite them to indicate that they had "resigned",
which plaintiff did.

(R.

00042, 00043).

The discharge slips prepared by plaintiff stated that
the defendant-claimants were quitting to attend school since
that was the reason plaintiff had been given by Johnson and
~lisa.

Concerning the circumstances of the claimants'

separation, the testimony of Dale Stokes during the hearing
with Appeal Referee is relevant:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(R.

Referee

Now, then since we have played the record prior
lo the claimant and claimant's representative
being sworn in, what had occurred prior to th ·
t
·
h
.
e1r
en rv i~to t e he~rrn~, we will allow Mr. Stokes
to con t~nu~ ~t this time as to the circumstances
of the. individuals' separation and why they are
appeal mg.

Stokes

~ecaus~

September 23, 1978 was on a Saturday, and
is their last of work, both Mr. Johnson and Mr.
Nolisa were scheduled for exit interviews, as is
normal procedure by the company, on Friday,
September 22.
When they came in for the exit
interview, they were given the Utah Department of
Employment Security Separation Notices, as
required by law.
Each of them refused to accept
the notice, stating that they did not wish to·
have it written as it was presented to them, in
that it said that their reason for leaving was to
go to school.
Mr. Nolisa said that his first
reason was, "he is tired of the discrimintory
attitude in the plant." And secondarily, thathe
was going to return to school.
The company had
no knowlegde of this contention prior to that
time.
Mr. ,1ohnson made no statement whatsoever.
Subsequent to the termination in September of
1978, both claimants filed for unemployment
compensation.
The Notice of Claim Filed states
that the claimant reports the reason for
separation from your- firm as "I left." That is
true of both statements.
Again, the claimants
th is time gave no reason for termination. It is
the company's contention that they left
voluntarily without good cause for resignatioo
and without compensable cause for resignatioo.
That is the only question in this hearing so far
as the company is concerned.

00091).

The defendant-claimants have not denied that they
informed plaintiff they were quitting to return to school, and
the fact that ~laintiff prepared discharge slips for the
claimants indicating that they were quitting to attend school
is rele-vant to plaintiff's belief that claimants Johnson and
Nolisa voluntarily left their jobs for that sole purpose, as
was pointed out by the Appeal Referee during the hearing:

- 10 -
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(R.

Green

. . . The blue slip, in which I saw, you know,
glanced at said, "To attend school.", you know,
but based upon that contention, when the claimant
was going to school for the whole of, still are
going to school, then, you know, well, it is
irrelevant to me.

Referee

No, that is not necessarily irrelevant. This was
the reason that they gave the employer that they
were leaving at that time. That becomes, then,
the reason he puts do•,m.

Green

Okay.
And if that is the reason that he put down
arbitrarily, and they didn't accept the blue slip
for, it is also my contention that, because they
did not accept the blue slip, it wasn't right.

Referee

That doesn't change the fact that they both went
to school, does it?

00100, 00101).

(Emphasis supplied) •

That the claimants voluntarily quit their jobs with
plaintiff to return to school is supported by more than
substantial evidence.

Both claimants informed plaintiff that

they were quitting to return to school.

(R. 00091).

Both gave

notice that they intended to quit well in advance of their
actual termination date, indicating that their decision to
leave was preplanned rather than the result of any force or
harrassmen t by plain tiff.
00091).

(R. 00042, 00043, 00082, 00085,

Claimants Johnson and Nolisa both terminated their

employment with plain tiff on the exact day they had stated they
would.

(R.

00091, 00092).

The claims for unemployment

benefits submitted by both claimants to the
defendant-Industrial Commission stated only that they had
"Quit".

(R. 00123, 00124).

Furthermore, the discharge slips

Prepared by plaintiff for the defendant-claimants upon their

- 11 -
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termination indicated that both claimants were "quitting to
return to school", as plaintiff had been toJd that they were.
(R.

00091,

00100,

00101).

Finally, both claimants began to

attend school at Utah State University in Logan, Utah on a
full-time basis on September 26, 1978, the Tuesday following
the day they quit.

(R.

00092).

Despite the overwhelming evidence that claimants
Johnson and Nolisa voluntarily quit to return to school, they
claim that they quit due to unsatisfactory working conditions,
consisting of their failure to obtain the status of Plant
Services "A" employees.

The record however, shows that the

reclassification claimants complain of occurred at least
sixteen months prior to their termination
00096)

(R.

00031, 00033,

and that pursuant to the request of Johnson and Nolisa,

plaintiff on two separate occasions reconsidered the
reclassifications only to determine that they were proper
appropriate and that no changes were necessary.

(R.

a~

00039).

The record further establishes that all of plaintiff's
employees in the Plant Services "B" category, including the
defendant-claimants, received the same hourly wage.
00097).

(R. 00038,

Although the Plant Services "A" employees received a

·
· ·
·
higher wage, their
responsi· b i· ] _1t1es
require
grea t er s k i' 11 s and

abilities than those required of the Plant Services "B"
and
·
employees, such as the disassembly and assembly of mac h ines

equipment for cleaning purposes.

(R.

- 12 -

00039,

00043).
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Furthermore, the defendant-claimants each had the opportunity
on at least five separate occasions to bid for the position of
Plant Services "A" employee, yet neither claimant made any
effort to do so.

(R. 00039, 00044, 00099).

The defendant-claimants voluntarily terminated their
employment with plaintiff without force, harrassment or
mistreatment.

Both claimants left for the purpose of returning

to school which they did.

Furthermore, the job

reclassification complained of by claimants was proper and
necessary and within the province of the plaintiff-employer.
Therefore, the evidence does not support a finding that
claimants Johnson and Nolisa terminated their employment with
good cause, and the decision of the Board of Review should be
reversed.
POINT II
SECTION 35-4-5(a) OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY ACT DISQUALIFIES CLAIMANTS FROM
RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FROM
DECEMBER 17, 1978 to JANUARY 27, 1979
Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended provides:
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits for the
purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(a)
For the week in which the claimant left work
voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the
commission, and for each week thereafter until the
claimant has performed services in bona fide covered
employment and earned wages for such services equal to
at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit
amount; provided, that no claimant shall.be ineligible
for benefits if the claimant leaves work under
circumstances of such a nature that it would be
contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a
disqt1ali f icat ion.

i

L
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In the instant case, the defendant-claimants did not
have good cause for voluntarily leaving their work with
plaintiff.
A.

Claimants Terminated Employment to Return to School
In Logan-Cache Knitting Mills v. Industrial

Commission, 99 Utah 1, 102 P.2d 495 (1940), the Court enforced
subdivision (a) of Utah Code Annotated

§

35-4-5 in determini~

a claimant to be ineligible for unemployment benefits where it
was established that he had left his job without good cause.
The meaning of "good cause" as it applies to Section 35-4-S(a)
has been discussed by the Utah Supreme Court.

In Denby v.

Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 626 at 630
(Utah 1977), this Court stated:
The initial determination of "good cause," for
voluntarily leaving employment, is a mixed question of
law and fact for the administrative agency. A
claimant has the burden of showing good cause for
leaving, when he voluntarily terminates suitable
employment.
"Good cause" has been defined as "such
cause as would similarly affect persons of reasonable
and normal sensitivity, and is limited to those
instances where the unemployment is caused by external
pressures so comoelling that a reasonablv prudent
person, exercising ordinary common sense and prud~~,
would be justified in quitting under similar
circumstances."
(Emphasis supplied) .
See also Miles v. Gronning, 581 P.2d 1334, 1338-1339 (Utah
1978).

It has been stated that the purpose of the Utah
'
· h f inanc1a
·
· 1 reserves for
Employment Security Act is 'to
establ1s
the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their

- 14 -
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own.

Alvord v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, l

Utah 2d 388, 267 P.2d 914 (1954).
~pears

to be

Although no Utah case

on point, other jurisdictions applying similar

unemployment statutes have repeatedly held that the
unemployment system cannot be used to subsidize an employee's
education.
In Keisling v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 181 A.2d 717 (Pa. 1962), the claimant had terminated
his employment to allow him to complete his last year of
Ehool.

In ruling that the claimant was disqualified from

receiving unemployment benefits, the court on page 718 of its
opinion stated:
However praiseworthy we may consider the thirst for
knowledge to be, it has become abundantly clear that
leaving employment to further one's education does not
constitute leaving work for a cause of necessitous and
compelling nature.
The case of Fenstersheib v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 124 A. 2d 375 (Pa. 1956), also involved a
claimant who had voluntarily left his employment to return to
' school.

In ruling against the claimant, the court on page 376,

Proclaimed:
While the desire to attend school is a laudable one,
the termination of employment for that reason cannot
be deemed "good cause".
In Perales v. Department of Human Resources
~lopment,

32 Cal.App. 3d 338, 108 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171

ll 973J, the court held that voluntarily terminating ones
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-employment to return to school does not constitute "good cause'
as required by the unemployment insurance system:
Turning to the facts of the case at bench, we cannot
say that quitting a job to attend school, no matter
how personally commendable the step mav be, is an
imperative and compelling reason of such magnitude as
to render the claimant eligible for unemployment benefits, at least in the absence of explicit
legislative authoritv.
If this were good cause withir.
the meaning of section 1256, untold numbers of persons
could quit their jobs to attend school while receivina
unemployment compensation benefits.
However great mav
be society's interest in furthering a working man's
education, we find nothing in the Unemployment
Insurance Law to sanction this objective • . . • The
unemplovment insurance system cannot be used to~
subsidize an emplovee 's education.
(Emphasis
supplied).
Other cases holding that leaving work to return to school does
not satisfy the "good cause" requirement are Zook v.
Unemployrnen t Compensation Board of Review, 188 A. 2d 783 (Pa.
1963); Dreistadt v. Catherwood, 286 N.Y.S.2d 921, 29 A.D. 2d
807 (1968); and Christophe v. Levine, 375 N. Y.S. 2d 483, 50
A.D. 2d 705 (1975).
In the instant case, claimants John son and Nolisa
voluntarily left their work with plaintiff to return to
school.

As was pointed out above, the defendant-claimants

informed plaintiff well in advance that they were quitting to
return to school.

(R. 00042, 00082, 00091).

Both claimants

terminated their employment with plain tiff on the date they had
stated they would.

(R. 00091, 00092).

The discharge slips

prepared for claimants by plaintiff indicated that both Johnson
and Nolisa h.ad quit to return to school

(R.

00091, 00100,
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00101), and both claimants returned to school only three days
after they quit.

(R. 00092).

Claimants maintain that they did not leave to return
~

school since they had been attending school during the

entire period of their employment with plaintiff.
00073).

(R.

00069,

However, neither claimant had been attending school

during the summer of 1978, nor were they enrolled at the time
they informed plaintiff of their intended termination.

That

the defendant-claimants did quit work to return to school is
further supported by the fact that in January, 1978, claimant
Nolisa requested a leave of absence from plaintiff's employment
to attend school, and did take such a leave of absence from
hooary 10, 1978 to March 15, 1978.
The Appeal Referee's decision dated February 15, 1979
stated:
On September 9, 1978, the claimants both advised their
employer that they were quitting on September 23,
1978.
It was the employer's understanding that the
claimants were quitting to attend school.
The claimants worked swing shift and had been
attending school during the time they worked for
Pepperidge Farms. They entered school Fall Quarter
1978 and are both attending at the present time.
The reasoning of the Appeal Referee was supported by
~bstantial

evidence that the claimants voluntarily terminated

t~ir employment with plaintiff for the sole purpose of

returning to school.

(R. 00085, 00086).

- 17 -
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During the hearing with the Appeal Referee, the
claimants themselves expressly admitted that they were
returning to school:

(R.

Referee

Now, then, it is indicated that you, uh, Mr.
Nolisa were returning to school. Is this correct:

Nolisa

No, it wasn't. Uh, Dale, these people wrote that
up. I wasn't there. I was just told them. r
was invited in the plant manager's office.

Referee

Now, excuse me, I have a form here completed~
January 9, 1979 showing that you are enrolled,
starting at Utah State University in September of
'76 and plan to complete in 1980.

Nolisa

Yeh.

Referee

Did you attend school in Fall Quarter?

Nolisa

Yeh. Even when I was working for Pepperidge
Farm, I was attending school full time.

Referee

You were attending school during the Summer
Quarter also?

Nolisa

No, during the summer quarters, I don't attend
school.

Referee

Well, that's what I sav, you quit September 23
and school doesn't start until about that time,
about September 26.

Nolisa

Yeh.

Referee

Did you enter school on September 26?

Nolisa

Yes,

Referee

All right. Now, I would ask the same questiO.!!J.
Mr. Johnson. Did you enter school on Septemb!£
26?

Johnson

Yes, I did.

00092).

I

did.

(Emphasis supplied).
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Since the defendant-claimants quit their jobs with
plaintiff to return to school and voluntary termination of
employment for that purpose does not constitute "good cause"
pursuant to the requirements of section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, claimants terminated their
employment without good cause and the decision of the Board of
Review is in error and must be reversed.
B.

Claimants' Unsuccessful Efforts To Be Reclassified
Does Not Constitute Good Cause For Leaving Work
Plaintiff's manufacturing operations in Richmond, Utah

began in 1974.

Job classifications were made according to the

practices of other Pepper idge Farm plan ts in other parts of the
country.

In 1977 plaintiff determined that job

reclassifications were necessary and a committee of management
reviewed job responsibilities and reclassified certain employee
positions.

One position affected by the reclassification was

that of Plant Services Helper.
groups:

This job was separated in to two

Plant Services "A" and Plant Services "B".

The "A"

group received higher pay due to their greater responsibilities.
(R. 00038).

Claimants Johnson and Nolisa were employed as Plant
Service Helpers at the time of the reclassification.

When

reclassification was instigated, neither claimant was working
the same work shift as those employees reclassified as Plant
Services "Arr.

Consequently, both claimants remained in the
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Plant Services "B" category and their salary was not
increased.

(R. 00098, 00099).

Claimants contend that plaintiff's refusal to
reclassify them as Plant Services "A" employees constituted
good cause for terminating their employment with plaintiff.
(R. 00062, 00068, 00072).

Claimants, however, were not

justified in leaving work due to their failure to be
reclassified since:
necessary;

(2)

(1)

the reclassification was justified and

the employees in group "A" received a higher

wage due to their greater responsibilities;

(3) claimants

received the same salary as all other employees in the "B"
group;

(4) plaintiff reevaluated claimants job classifications

on two separate occasions only to determine that they were
proper and appropriate; and (5) claimants had the opportunity
to bid for the position of Plant Services "A" on at least five
separate occasions.
During the hearing with the Appeal Referee, the
Referee noted that the manner in which an employer assigns its
jobs is entirely within the province of the employer.
00098).

(R.

Despite that province, the reclassification of Plant

Services to groups "A" and "B" was necessary and the higher
wages paid to the group "A" employees were justified because of
their greater responsibilities.

As stated by Dale Stokes in

his affidavit dated May 25, 1979:
There are distinct and specific responsibiliti7s to a
Plant Services "A" classification that differ in
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skill, ability and responsibility than a Plant Services "B"
employee.
Particularly, for example an "A" classification
includes dissembly and assembly of equipment and machines
for cleaning purposes.
(R.

00039) .
Not only were their responsibilities different from
11

those of the Plant Services

A

11

employees, but claimants

Johnson and Nolisa did the same work and received the same pay
as all other employees in the "B

11

group.

(R.

00038, 00097).

Furthermore, at the request of claimants, the reclassification
of the Plant Service Helpers into groups "A" and

11

B" was

reviewed by plaintiff in January, 1978, and in August, 1978.
On both occasions plaintiff determined that the distinction

between Plant Services "A

11

employees and Plant Services "B"

employees was proper and that no change should be made in that
classification.

00039, 00043, 00044).

(R.

That the defendant-claimants failure to obtain
reclassification was not good cause for leaving the employment
of plaintiff is further supported by the fact that claimants
failed to file a formal grievance with plaintiff regarding the
job classifications.

Plaintiff's employee's manual, at page 18

(R. 00025), provides the appropriate procedure to be followed
for complaints and problems.

Claimants failed to follow those

Procedures concerning their complaints about the distinctions
between the group

11

A

11

and "B" positions.

(R.

00021).

The merits of claimants allegations that they were
iustified in quitting because of their classification as Plant
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Services "B" employees was addressed by the Appeal Referee in
his decision as follows:
There is good cau~e for the voluntary leaving of work
where the facts disclose a real, substantial and
compelling reason of such nature as would cause a
reasonable person genuinely desirous of retaining
employment to take similar action.
In the present instance the main thrust of the
claimants' testimonies concerned the grievances they
felt. resulted ~rom their employment situation. They I
c~ns1dered their attendance at school to be seco~acy
since they had attended school before while working et'
Pepperidge Farms.
The claimants were being paid the same rate as others
assigned to the work they were doing and, while they
may have felt others were being given preferential
treatment, they had filed a grievance through the
proper channels for redress.
It is considered that
they reasonably could have been expected to continue
their employment until such time as the issues had
been decided rather than quitting to become totally
unemployed without prospects of other work.
(R. 00083,

00086).

(Emphasis supplied).

James F. Hannan, dissenting in the Board of Review's
decision, also recognized that the voluntary termination ~ t~
defendant-claimants of their employment with plaintiff due to
their complaints about the job classifications did not
constitute a real,

substantial and compelling reason of such a

nature that reasonable persons genuinely desirous of retaining
employment would also have quit.

Mr. Hannan stated:

I respectfully dissent on the grounds that the
claimant chose to remain employed for 16 months after
the job classification issue arose.
It appears,
therefore, that his decision to terminate was . .
motivated by something other than the job cond1~·
(R.

00031,

00033).

(Emphasis supplied).
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_......I

Perhaps the most convincing evidence that the
claimants' unsuccessful efforts to be reclassified as Plant
services "A" employees did not constitute "good cause" for
quitting their jobs is the fact that on at least five separate
occasions, both claimants had the opportunity to bid for that
position and neither Johnson nor Nolisa made any effort to do
so.

(R. 00039).
Concerning the failure of the defendant-claimants to

bid for the position of Plant Services "A" employee, the
testimony of Mr. Dale Stokes at the hearing with the Appeal
Referee is enlightening:
Referee

Well, I will ask him the question concerning
that. Is this a company policy to allot jobs on
seniority, Mr. Stokes?

Stokes

It is. When the jobs were created, they were
offered on a seniority basis to those people who
were working on the night owl shift.

Referee

On the night shift?

Stokes

That's correct.

Referee

Was that where thses (sic) gentlemen were
employed?

Stokes

They were employed on the afternoon, p.m. shift;
however, on at least five different occasions
subsequent to the reevaluation of the job, the
job was posted for bid. On none of those
occasions did either gentlemen bid.

Referee

In other words, the job was posted for bidding on
the bulletin board?

Stokes

That's correct.

(R. 00098, 00099).

(Emphasis supplied) .

Mr. Stokes testified further:

- 23 -
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(R.

Stokes

Jobs were posted on the board in the normal
process of our bidding procedure

Nolisa

Are they sent there, are they sent about eight
months or nine months, when they sent out them?

Referee

Excuse me, Mr. Nolisa, will you allow him the
courtesy of completing his statement before you
interrupt him?

Nolisa

I will.

Referee

All right, fine.
Now, Mr. Stokes has been
talking and let him finish his statement
concerning that, please.

Stokes

When the jobs came open, became available.

Referee

When the jobs were available so you were going to
hire somebody for those positions?

Stokes

Right.
Then they were posted in various [places)
conspicuous to all employees for a minimum of 48
hours before the job was actually filled.
Employees desiring to bid onto those jobs were
requested to follow the normal bid procedure
which is to indicate their desire to have the job
by filling out a book in personnel or giving a
note to personnel.

Referee

And on no occasion was that done by either Mr.
Johnson or Nolisa, to your knowledge?

Stokes

That is correct.

00099, 00100).

(Emphasis supplied).

A consideration of the above factors, including the
fact that both claimants could have become Plant Services "A"
employees had they only bid for that position on one of the
many occasions it was posted for bidding, makes it clear that
the claimants' dissatisfaction with their working conditions in
addition to their failure to obtain the classification of Plant
Services "A" employees did not constitute good cause for
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voluntary termination of their employment.

Accordingly, the

decision of the Board of Review determining claimants to be
eligible for unemployment benefits from December 17, 1978 to
January 27, 1979 should be reversed.

c.

Justified Reprimand By Employer Does Not
Constitute Good Cause For Voluntary Termination
Section 35-4-5(a) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

amended, disqualifies a claimant from receiving unemployment
compensation where the claimant-employee terminates his
employment because of a justified reprimand by his employer for
misconduct.

Although no Utah case appears to be on point,

other jurisdictions addressing the issue have consistently held
such a termination to be without good cause.
In Barajas v. Industrial

Commissio~,

487 P.2d 598

(Colo. 1971) , the Court ruled that the claimant was
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits after he quit
because he refused to be laid-off for ten days as discipline
for his "excessive absenteeism and tardiness and for failure to
Punch the time clock."
The case of Nenoff v. Culligan Soft Water, 542 P.2d
837 (Idaho 1975), involved a claimant who had left his

employment rather than accept his employer's restriction of
denying him access to the off ice at night.

The Industrial

Commission denied the claimant unemployment benefits because he
had voluntarily left his employment without good cause.

On
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review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Ind is trial Commission.

See also, Unemoloymen t Compensation

Board of Review v. Tune, 350 A. 2d 876 (Pa. 1976), where it was
held that voluntary termination of ones employment because of
being suspended does not entitle the claimant to recover
unemployment compensation.
Claimants Johnson and Nolisa were disciplined on
August 31, 1978 for insubordination.

Johnson was suspended for

two days without pay and Nolisa for five days.

(R. 00037).

Although claimants allege that they were treated unfairly, bott
claimants were justifiably reprimanded under the circumstances,
since they refused to perform a job which was no different fro:
jobs requested to be done and performed by them on numerous
other occasions during the sixteen month period following the
job reclassification.

(R. 00020, 00021).

The de fendan t-cla iman ts voluntarily terminated their
employment with plaintiff.

Their notice of termination

occurred immediately following their suspension without pay for
insubordination.

The discipline imposed by plaintiff was

justified and claimants' termination of their employment~
retaliation to that discipline was without good cause.
Consequently, the order entitling the defendant-claimants to '
receive unemployment compensation from December 17, 1978 to
January 27, 1979 must be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the
Appeal Referee determining the defendant-claimants to be
ineligible to receive unemployment benefits from December 17,
1978 to January 27, 1979 and establishing an overpayment of

compensation to claimants should be affirmed, and the decision
of the Board of Review, Department of Employment Security,
Industrial Commission of Utah, should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted

this~

day of October, 1979.
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